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Burning the House to Roast a Pig:
Examining Florida’s Controversial
Social Media Law
Wes P. Rahn
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent proliferation of social media platforms has revolutionized
the way individuals convey ideas and communicate with one another.
Social media has quickly become the most dominate form of
communication, surpassing more traditional modes of communication
such as newspapers and television. It is estimated that over two-thirds
of American adults now use social networking sites.1 Moreover, an
astonishing 90% of young adults use social media.2 Social media has not
only become an integral part of American culture in terms of
entertainment and communication, but has also become a useful tool for
politicians and the electorate who wish to engage in political discourse.
Social media sites like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram enable
politicians and candidates running for political office to reach a wide
base of voters with targeted campaign advertisements. Consequently,
between January 2019 and October 2020, both Joseph Biden and
Donald Trump collectively spent a whopping $201 million on Facebook
advertisements alone.3 Moreover, it is impossible to calculate the
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least, I would like to thank the faculty and staff of the Mercer University School of Law
for providing me with the tools, resources, and ability to become a published author.
1. Andrew Perrin, Social Media Usage, PEW RESEARCH (Oct. 8, 2015),
https://www.secretintelligenceservice.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/PI_2015-1008_Social-Networking-Usage-2005-2015_FINAL.pdf.
2. Perrin, supra note 1.
3. Grace Manthey, Presidential campaigns set new records for social media ad
spending, ABC7 (Oct. 29, 2020), https://abc7.com/presidential-race-campaign-spendingtrump-political-ads-biden/7452228/.
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insurmountable value of advertising that candidates receive from
individual users on social media who share posts supporting a
particular candidate at their own volition.
Due to the unique ability to provide a forum for candidates and
voters to engage in political discourse, social media platforms have
garnered tremendous influence over elections and their outcomes.
These platforms have become the new town hall where individuals are
influenced by ideas and users often debate one another on a variety of
topics. While social media providers often claim to be independent
unbiased networks, there are widespread allegations that these
providers use their immense political influence to favor candidates and
users who have liberal leanings. In response to these allegations,
several state lawmakers have drafted laws aimed at regulating social
media platforms and their allegedly biased influence on our political
system. Below, I will discuss the legality of such laws by examining the
intersectionality of social media platforms, preexisting federal law, and
the United States Constitution.
II. BACKGROUND
United States politics have grown increasingly partisan over the last
decade. Some Americans now fear that the partisan divide has
infiltrated social media platforms and empowered such platforms to
silence those with opposing political beliefs. The most common
allegation is that social media companies censor politically rightleaning accounts and use algorithms to suppress the number of users
that engage with posts shared by conservative accounts. Critics of the
algorithms claim that users with conservative ideologies do not have
nearly the same amount of engagement as users with more liberal
views. However, while companies such as Twitter admit that they
utilize algorithms to provide a more personalized experience to their
users, former Twitter CEO, Jack Dorsey, has denied that such
algorithms are used to suppress those with conservative ideologies.4
Facebook CEO and founder, Mark Zuckerberg, has echoed similar
sentiments. Zuckerberg has defended Facebook’s algorithms, adding
that Facebook is a “platform for all ideas.”5

4. Christopher A. Bail, On social media, encountering opposing views can make
people become even more wedded to their own., DUKE UNIVERSITY POPULATION RESEARCH
INSTITUTE (Sept. 7, 2018), https://dupri.duke.edu/news-events/news/twitters-flawedsolution-political-polarization.
5. Morgan Chalfant, Cruz presses Zuckerberg on alleged censorship of conservative
speech, THE HILL (April 10, 2018), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/382538-cruztangles-with-zuckerberg-over-censorship-of-conservative-speech.
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Another common allegation is that social media platforms unfairly
ban conservative users based on their political ideologies. Proponents of
this theory claim that conservative voices, such as former President
Donald Trump, are frequently banned from platforms simply because
their political views run contrary to those of Facebook, Twitter,
YouTube, and other providers. Following the U.S. Capitol protest that
occurred on January 6, 2021, Twitter permanently banned former
President Trump from the platform. Shortly thereafter, Facebook and
YouTube followed suit and banned the controversial politician
indefinitely.6 Twitter issued a statement declaring that “[a]fter close
review of recent Tweets from the @realDonaldTrump account and the
context around them we have permanently suspended the account due
to the risk of further incitement of violence.”7 All three platforms assert
that the former President was banned for inciting violence, however
those statements have not satisfied a vocal minority who insist that
Trump was wrongfully removed from the platforms due to partisan
motivations.
In an effort to diminish the perceived influence that social media
companies have on political discourse, Republican lawmakers have
begun to pass laws aimed at regulating social media companies, the
algorithms they use, and the methods in which they ban or censor
content. Florida Governor Ron DeSantis recently became the first
governor to sign such legislation.8 However, before examining the
Florida bill, it is important to understand existing laws that protect
private companies like social media providers from unwanted
government interference. These companies are private entities, and
they are afforded many of the same protections and rights under the
United States Constitution as ordinary citizens. Is it constitutional
under the First Amendment for the government to regulate the way
social media platforms monitor speech on their site? Apart from the
Constitution, are there existing federal laws that safeguard social
media platforms who wish to censor certain users? These questions are

6. Jessica Guynn, Donald Trump ruled Facebook, Twitter before he was banned. Will
@realdonaldtrump log into Gab or somewhere else?, USA TODAY (Feb. 8, 2021),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2021/02/08/trump-facebook-twitter-youtube-banwhere-next-gab-parler/4440645001/.
7. Ben Collins, Twitter permanently suspends President Donald Trump, NBC News
(Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/twitter-permanently-banspresident-donald-trump-n1253588.
8. Florida Governor, Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop the Censorship of
Floridians
by
Big
Tech,
FLORIDA
GOVERNOR
(May
24,
2021),
https://www.flgov.com/2021/05/24/governor-ron-desantis-signs-bill-to-stop-the-censorshipof-floridians-by-big-tech/.
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paramount to understanding whether state or federal governments
have the authority to regulate social media platforms and the content
they choose to provide.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE INTERNET
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution is perhaps
the most well-known and widely cited constitutional provision. The
amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.”9 While the language of the amendment is
straightforward, the application of the law to speech over the internet is
far less elementary.
A. The Spectrum of First Amendment Scrutiny
Different forms of media are subject to different levels of First
Amendment protections. The United States Supreme Court has held
that “[e]ach medium of expression . . . must be assessed for First
Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its
own problems.”10 For example, out of all forms of communication,
broadcast media has received the most limited First Amendment
protection.11 In reaching this conclusion, courts have reasoned that
broadcast media has established “a uniquely pervasive presence in the
lives of all Americans,” and “material presented over the airwaves
confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the
home, where the individual’s right to be left alone plainly outweighs the
First Amendment rights of an intruder.”12 Accordingly, many laws
regulating speech over broadcast media have been upheld, and there
has been an extensive history of government regulation of broadcast
media providers.13 Conversely, while broadcast media providers receive
the most limited First Amendment protection, newspapers and other
print mediums enjoy the highest degree of protection under the law.
There, courts have held that any compulsion by government on
newspapers, which requires them to publish that which reason tells
9. U.S. Const. amend. I. (emphasis added).
10. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975).
11. Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748
(1978).
12. Id.
13. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 U.S.
367 (1969).
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them they should not, is unconstitutional.14 These holdings have
established a spectrum of how laws regulating speech should be applied
differently under the First Amendment depending on the form of
expression.
In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,15 the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of how to treat speech on the internet under the
First Amendment. There, the Court held that internet speech should
receive the same First Amendment protection as other speech and the
factors that favored government regulation of speech on broadcast
platforms are “not present in cyberspace.”16 The Court reasoned that
the internet is not as invasive as radio and television because
“communications over the Internet do not ‘invade’ an individual’s home
or appear on one’s computer screen unbidden.”17 Also, unlike the
scarcity of broadcast media at the time Congress first began to regulate
it, the internet is widely available to nearly every American. The court
presumed that government regulation of speech on the internet is “more
likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage
it.”18 Therefore, the Court held that there was no basis for limiting the
level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to speech on
the internet.19
While the internet does generally enjoy the highest level of First
Amendment protection, that is not to say that speech on the internet
cannot be regulated. The First Amendment does not guarantee that all
speech is safe from government regulation. In fact, several forms of
speech such as obscenity, libelous speech, and incitements to riot are
not entitled to First Amendment protection and may be banned
outright.20 However, as long as internet speech does not contain any of
these exceptions, the speech will be entitled to the highest level of
protection.21 Such protected speech includes speech that may be
considered by some to be offensive: “[T]he fact that society may find
speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it.”22 In
conclusion, speech on the internet should be treated no differently than

14. Miami Herald Publishing Co., Div. of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241, 256 (1974).
15. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
16. Id. at 868.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 885.
19. Id. at 870.
20. Ian C. Ballon, E-Commerce and Internet Law § 39.02[1] (2020).
21. Id.
22. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 745.
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any other speech, and therefore, should enjoy full First Amendment
protection so long as the speech is not obscene, libelous, or an
incitement of violence.
B. Internet Service Providers
The First Amendment prohibits both state and federal governments
from infringing on an individual’s right to free speech. However, does
the Amendment’s protection extend to speech on the internet that is
regulated by privately owned service providers on their own platforms?
The answer is no. Although the government is prohibited from
regulating most speech on the internet, that prohibition does not apply
to internet service providers who elect to self-regulate and control the
information available on their sites.23 On the contrary, courts would
likely rule that internet service providers, such as social media
platforms, actually have a constitutional right to decide whether to
censor speech on their sites. Courts have recognized that “the First
Amendment, the terms of which apply to governmental action,
ordinarily does not itself throw into constitutional doubt the decisions of
private citizens to permit, or to restrict, speech . . . even where those
decisions take place within the framework of a regulatory regime such
as broadcasting.”24 Therefore, even when speech is communicated on
mediums like broadcast media—which enjoys far less First Amendment
protections than the internet—a private individual or provider has a
right to restrict the speech of another user. Furthermore, not only do
social media providers likely have a constitutional right to gatekeep
content that users share on their sites, but there are other existing
federal laws that encourage internet service providers to do so.
IV. EXISTING FEDERAL LAW
In Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services Co.,25 (PRODIGY), an
internet service provider, operated a large computer network which had
over two million subscribers.26 The site was made up of several bulletin
boards which subscribers used to communicate with one another.27 The
bulletin boards were akin to “what today might be called social

23. John B. Morris & Julie M. Carpenter, Internet Law and Practice § 24:11 (2021).
24. Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission, 518 U.S. 727, 737 (1996).
25. No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
26. Id. at *1.
27. Id.
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media.”28 One of the bulletin boards, aptly named Money Talk, was, at
the time, one of the largest and most widely read financial bulletin
boards in the entire country.29 In order to maintain a family-oriented
site, PRODIGY undertook to screen and review the content posted on
each bulletin board. The litigation arose out of the libelous post of an
anonymous user on the Money Talk bulletin board which accused the
plaintiff of committing criminal acts.30 The court held that, because
PRODIGY undertook to exercise editorial control and review posts
made on the bulletin boards, PRODIGY had a legal duty to censor the
libelous statements and was therefore liable to the plaintiff for the
anonymous post.31 In the wake of this decision, one thing became
apparent to internet service providers—by taking affirmative steps to
monitor and censor content on a platform, internet service providers
were subjecting themselves to liability for content shared by their users.
Providers were in essence being punished for undertaking to screen
their sites.
Partially in response to the Stratton decision, Congress enacted 47
U.S.C. § 230.32 The statute provides that “[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.”33 Additionally, the law shielded internet service providers
from liability by providing the following:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of . . . any action voluntarily taken in good faith to
restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected.34
Congress enacted this law in-part to eliminate the disincentives for
self-regulation created by the Stratton decision.35 “By its plain
language, § 230 creates a federal immunity [for] any cause of action
that would make service providers liable for information originating

28. NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, No. 4:21cv220-RH-MAF, 2021 WL 2690876, *5 (N.D.
Fla. June 30, 2021).
29. Stratton, 1995 WL 323710, at 1.
30. Id. at *1–*2.
31. Id. at *4.
32. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2021).
33. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
34. 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(2), (c)(2)(a) (emphasis added).
35. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
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with a third-party user of the service.”36 Furthermore, the statute
encourages providers like social media platforms to restrict access of
any content they themselves deem objectionable.
The statute also includes a preemption clause to establish how the
statute comports with state law. Under § 230(e)(3), it is provided that
“[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed
under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”37 In
other words, any state statute that imposes liability on internet service
providers for restricting content will be preempted by the federal
statute.
No longer are internet service providers discouraged from monitoring
and restricting content on their platforms out of fear that they might be
liable for the content of other users. The statute allows “computer
service providers to establish standards of decency without risking
liability to do so.”38 The law encourages providers to create their own
standards and policies for what content is or isn’t permitted on their
platform. Moreover, courts have held that the statute does not require
providers to use any particular form of restriction when determining
which content to allow.39 Internet service providers—including social
media providers—are entitled under the law to censor or forbid any
content in which they themselves find objectionable. This includes
blocking and even deplatforming users who post objectionable content,
and what is considered objectionable is left entirely for the provider to
determine.
47 U.S.C. § 230 transformed the way social media providers monitor
and restrict content on their platforms. These providers have unbridled
discretion to control what content they choose to censor or allow.
Accordingly, the federal law and traditional First Amendment
protections have made it nearly impossible for state or federal
governments to pass legislation aimed at regulating social media
platforms. However, that has not prevented one state from attempting
to do just that.

36. Id. at 330.
37. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).
38. NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *6 (quoting Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 991 F.3d 66,
73 (2d. Cir. 2021)).
39. Domen, 991 F.3d at 72.
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V. FLORIDA BECOMES THE FIRST
On May 24, 2021, Governor Ron DeSantis signed Florida Senate Bill
No. 7072.40 During a press release on the day of the signing, Florida
Lieutenant Governor Jeanette Nunez issued the following statement:
What we’ve been seeing across the U.S. is an effort to silence,
intimidate, and wipe out dissenting voices by the leftist media and big
corporations. Today, by signing SB 7072 into law, Florida is taking back
the virtual public square as a place where information and ideas can
flow freely. Many of our constituents know the dangers of being silenced
or have been silenced themselves under communist rule. Thankfully in
Florida we have a Governor that fights against big tech oligarchs that
contrive, manipulate, and censor if you voice views that run contrary to
their radical leftist narrative.41
The law was a response to allegations of bias and censorship by large
social media platforms in favor of liberal ideologies. Further proof of
Florida’s motivation for passing such a law can be found in the
“findings” section of the bill. There, the bill provides that “[s]ocial media
platforms have unfairly censored, shadow banned, deplatformed, and
applied post-prioritization algorithms to Floridians.”42 Such claims are
consistent with grievances that conservatives have commonly expressed
regarding social media platforms.
To regulate the allegedly biased platforms, S.B. 7072 was codified
into two statutes: Fla. Stat. §§ 106.07243 and 501.2041.44 Both statutes
apply only to social media platforms that either have “annual gross
revenues in excess of $100 million” or have “at least 100 million
monthly individual platform participants globally.”45
The first statute prohibits social media platforms from banning or
deplatforming a candidate that is running for political office. Under Fla.
Stat. § 106.072, “[a] social media platform may not willfully deplatform
a candidate for office who is known by the social media platform to be a
candidate . . . .”46 The statue imposes a fine on social media platforms in
violation of the statute in the amount of “$250,000 per day for a
candidate for statewide office and $25,000 per day for a candidate for
other offices.”47 The statute does not elaborate on how social media
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

S.B. 7072, 123rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2021).
Florida Governor, supra note 8.
S.B. 7072, 123rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2021).
Fla. Stat. § 106.072 (2021).
Fla. Stat. § 501.2041 (2021).
Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(1)(g).
Fla. Stat. § 106.072(2).
Fla. Stat. § 106.072(3).
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platforms are expected to know which users are running for political
office.
The second statue is broken down into ten subsections that address
several issues including censorship and post-prioritization algorithms.
These subsections place laborious burdens on social media platforms.
First, “[a] social media platform must publish the standards, including
detailed definitions, it uses or has used for determining how to censor,
deplatform, and shadow ban.”48 Second, “[a] social media platform must
apply censorship, deplatforming, and shadow banning standards in a
consistent manner among its users on the platform.”49 Third, “[a] social
media platform must inform each user about any changes to its user
rules, terms, and agreements before implementing the changes and
may not make changes more than once every 30 days.”50 Fourth, “[a]
social media platform may not censor or shadow ban a user’s content or
material or deplatform a user from the social media platform . . .
[w]ithout notifying the user who posted or attempted to post the content
or material.”51 Fifth, “[a] social media platform must . . . provide a
mechanism that allows a user to request the number of other individual
platform participants who were provided or shown the user’s content or
posts and provide, upon request, a user with the number of other
individual platform participants who were provided or shown content or
posts.”52 Sixth, “[a] social media platform must . . . [c]ategorize
algorithms used for post-prioritization and shadow banning [and a]llow
a user to opt out of post-prioritization and shadow banning algorithm
categories to allow sequential or chronological posts and content.”53
Seventh, “[a] social media platform must provide users with an annual
notice on the use of algorithms for post-prioritization and shadow
banning and reoffer annually the opt-out opportunity . . . . “54 Eighth,
“[a] social media platform may not apply or use post-prioritization or
shadow banning algorithms for content and material posted by or about
a user who is known by the social media platform to be a
candidate . . . .”55 Ninth, “[a] social media platform must allow a user
who has been deplatformed to access or retrieve all of the user’s
information, content, material, and data for at least 60 days after the

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(2)(a).
Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(2)(b).
Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(2)(c).
Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(2)(d)(1).
Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(2)(e)(1).
Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(2)(f)(1)–(2).
Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(2)(g).
Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(2)(h).
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user receives [] notice. . . . ”56 Tenth, “[a] social media platform may not
take any action to censor, deplatform, or shadow ban a journalistic
enterprise based on the content of its publication or broadcast.”57
Unsurprisingly, the law has been met with harsh criticism,
condemnation, and legal challenges. Both statutes place extremely
strenuous responsibilities on social media platforms. Furthermore, the
vagueness of the statutes when combined with the arduous
requirements therein create a recipe for litigation. Consequently, it
wasn’t long before trade associations that represent affected social
media platforms moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the law
from taking effect, and on the eve of the statutes’ effective dates, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida issued
its decision in NetChoice, LLC v. Moody.58
VI. CHALLENGING THE FLORIDA LAW
In NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, NetChoice and Computer &
Communications Industry Association, two trade associations whose
members include social media platforms, filed a complaint challenging
Florida Senate Bill No. 7072—particularly Fla. Stat. §§ 106.072 and
501.2041.59 The complaint included multiple counts alleging that the
Florida statutes both violate constitutional rights and are preempted by
existing federal law. In more detail, the complaint alleged that the law
“violates the First Amendment’s free-speech clause by interfering with
the providers’ editorial judgment, compelling speech, and prohibiting
speech.”60 Additionally, the complaint also alleged that the law is
preempted by 47 U.S.C. § 230 which “expressly prohibits imposition of
liability on an interactive computer service—this includes a socialmedia provider—for action taken in good faith to restrict access to
material the service finds objectionable.”61
Ultimately, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Florida granted the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary
injunction and ordered that the state of Florida take no steps to enforce
Fla. Stat. §§ 106.072 or 501.2041.62 After determining that the plaintiff
had fulfilled the prerequisites for a preliminary injunction, the court
found the plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits of their First
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(2)(i).
Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(2)(j).
No. 4:21cv220-RH-MAF, 2021 WL 2690876, *5 (N.D. Fla. June 30, 2021).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *12.
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Amendment claim; strict scrutiny should be applied to the Florida
statutes in question; and the plaintiff was likely to succeed on the
merits of their claim that the Florida statutes were preempted by
federal law.63
A. First Amendment Claim
The court in NetChoice acknowledged that it has not yet been settled
where exactly social media fits into traditional First Amendment
jurisprudence, but “three things are clear.”64 First, the social media
providers’ allegedly biased actions do not violate the First Amendment
because the First Amendment “does not restrict the rights of private
entities not performing traditional, exclusive public functions.”65
Second, as discussed, the First Amendment applies to speech over the
internet. Third, a state’s power to regulate speech does not increase
simply because one or more “powerful entities have gained a monopoly
in the marketplace of ideas, reducing the means available to candidates
or other individuals to communicate on matters of public interest.”66
The court then addressed the aforementioned issue of how to treat
social media providers under the First Amendment. The plaintiff
argued that social media providers should be treated just like any other
private speaker, and therefore, the statutes infringe on their
constitutional right to free speech.67 In support of its argument, the
plaintiff cited to three Supreme Court decisions which held that a
private entity could not be required by the state to permit unwanted
speech. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,68 the Supreme
Court held that a Florida statute requiring a newspaper to publish a
candidate’s response to previous statements made by the newspaper
was unconstitutional.69 However, the court in NetChoice distinguished
newspapers from social media providers because newspapers create or
select all of their content, while it would be nearly impossible for social
media providers to do the same.70 In the plaintiff’s second case, Hurley
v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston,71 the
Supreme Court held that an association had a First Amendment right
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *8
418 U.S. 241 (1974).
NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *8.
Id.
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
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to exclude a gay-rights group from a private parade.72 However, the
court in NetChoice reasoned that, unlike social media platforms, the
parade was not an “invisible-to-the-provider event.”73 Lastly, in Pacific
Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California,74 the
Supreme Court held that a state could not require a company to include
in its billing envelopes an organization’s newsletter that contained
viewpoints which the company disagreed with.75 Again, the company
knew exactly what went into every billing envelope. Thus, this was not
an “invisible-to-the-provider forum.”76 All three cases support the
plaintiff’s argument that a private party exercising editorial judgment
cannot be required by the government to publish or allow content with
which the party disagrees. However, the court in NetChoice
distinguished the parties in those cases from social media providers in
that the content on social media platforms is mostly invisible to the
provider. A social media provider does not have the resources to review
each post shared on their platform, and the “overwhelming majority of
the material never gets reviewed except by algorithms.”77 Newspapers,
on the other hand, personally select and publish their content and are
well aware of all the material that is included in their publications.
After making that distinction, the court did admit that it found the
plaintiff’s line of cases convincing and acknowledged that states are
commonly prohibited from interfering with a private entity’s editorial
judgment.78
The State relied on two Supreme Court cases to argue that the
Florida statutes were not in violation of the First Amendment. In
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights,79 the Supreme
Court upheld a federal statute that required schools to allow military
recruiters access to the schools’ facilities and students.80 In upholding
the law, the Supreme Court determined that this was an issue of
conduct, not speech.81 The statute did not require the schools to say
anything, nor did the statute prohibit the schools from saying

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *8.
Id.
475 U.S. 1 (1986).
NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876 at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *9.
547 U.S. 47 (2006).
NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *9.
Id.
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“whatever they wished whenever and however they wished.”82
Similarly, in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,83 the Supreme
Court held that there was no violation under the First Amendment
when a state court ruling required a shopping center to allow
individuals to solicit petition signatures while on the shopping center’s
property.84 Both of the State’s cases establish that a government can
compel a private party to allow a visitor on their property so long as the
private party is not required to speak or restricted from speaking.
However, unlike the mandates in the State’s two cases, the Florida
statutes in question do impede on the social media providers’ ability to
speak freely. The Florida statutes “explicitly forbid social media
platforms from appending their own statements to posts by some
users.”85 Additionally, the statutes “compel the platforms to change
their own speech . . . by dictating how the platforms may arrange
speech on their sites.”86
The court concluded that neither line of cases is directly applicable to
social media platforms, or the Florida statutes aimed at regulating
them.87 A social media platform is not like a newspaper or other
traditional form of publication because, to a substantial extent, the
content on a social media platform is invisible to the provider. On the
other hand, the Florida statutes cannot be said to only regulate social
media providers’ conduct, because the statutes clearly restrict the
providers’ speech as well. However, after balancing the cases put forth
to support each party’s arguments, the court determined that the prior
decisions favor the plaintiff’s stance that the statutes should be subject
to traditional First Amendment scrutiny.88 Consequently, whether the
plaintiff would succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim
now depended on the level of scrutiny which was to be applied.
B. Strict Scrutiny
As previously mentioned, the court held that strict scrutiny should be
applied to the Florida statutes.89 Both content-based and viewpointbased restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny.90 A law
82.
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restricting speech is deemed to be content-based if it is limited to only
certain speech because of ideas and messages expressed therein.91
Similarly, a law is deemed to be viewpoint-based if the motivation for
passing the legislation is based on the perceived viewpoint of the
individuals whose speech is being restricted.92 A finding of either
restriction will trigger strict scrutiny.93
The court determined that strict scrutiny should be applied because
“[t]he Florida statutes at issue are about as content-based as it gets.”94
First, Fla. Stat. § 106.072 prohibits a social media platform from
deplatforming a candidate running for political office.95 The statute does
not apply to anyone else and is thus a content-based restriction.96
Second, Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(2)(h) restricts social media providers from
applying post-prioritization to content posted “by or about a
candidate.”97 This is yet another example of a content-based restriction.
Third, under Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(2)(j), a social media provider is
prohibited from taking any action to censor, deplatform, or shadow ban
a journalistic enterprise based on the “content” of such an enterprise.98
“[P]rohibiting a platform from making a decision based on content is
itself a content-based restriction.”99 For these reasons, the court found
that the Florida statutes are content-based, and thus, subject to strict
scrutiny.100
Even if the court found that the restrictions in the Florida statutes
were not content-based, the plaintiff provided ample evidence that the
State’s primary motivation for passing the statutes was based on social
media providers’ perceived liberal viewpoints.101 The State’s motivation
for passing the statutes was made abundantly clear in Governor
DeSantis’s signing statement. In the statement, Governor DeSantis
wrote: “Day in and day out, our freedom of speech as conservatives is
under attack by the ‘big tech’ oligarchs in Silicon Valley. But in Florida,
we said this egregious example of biased silencing will not be
tolerated.”102 The motivation for the law is a thus a retaliation to the
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perceived threat of social media providers’ liberal ideologies. “This
viewpoint-based motivation, without more, subjects the legislation to
strict scrutiny, root and branch.”103
After determining that strict scrutiny applied to the Florida Statutes,
the court examined whether or not the statutes would survive such
scrutiny. To survive strict scrutiny, a law infringing on speech must
both further a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest.104 According to the court, “[t]hese statutes come
nowhere close.”105 The court reasoned that promoting speech for one
ideology while limiting speech for another is not a compelling state
interest.106 However, even if it were a compelling state interest, the
Florida statutes are far from narrowly tailored. Accordingly, the court
found that the Florida legislation could not survive strict scrutiny, and
therefore the plaintiff was likely to prevail on the merits of their First
Amendment claim.107
C. Federal Preemption Claim
Lastly, the court held that some sections of the Florida statutes are
preempted by existing federal law.108 As previously discussed, 47 U.S.C.
§ 230 conferred upon social media providers the right to restrict content
on their platforms which they find objectionable. Moreover, § 230
includes a preemption clause which prohibits states from imposing
liability on internet service providers based on laws that are
“inconsistent with this section.”109 After reviewing the Florida statutes,
the court determined that several provisions are inconsistent with the
federal law and are therefore preempted.110 First, Fla. Stat. § 106.072
prohibits a social media platform from deplatforming a candidate for
political office and imposes several fines on platforms who violate the
statute.111 This statute is clearly inconsistent with 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2),
which shields social media platforms from liability for restricting access
of content they themselves find objectionable. Under the federal law,
social media platforms are entitled to use their discretion when
choosing to restrict content, and these restrictions come in many forms
103.
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including the deplatforming of a user. 112 Accordingly, the court held
that the Florida statute would impose liability on platforms who use
their discretion to censor and remove content shared by a political
candidate even if the platform found the candidate’s content
objectionable. Imposing such liability is at odds with a platform’s
statutory right to restrict access to objectionable content. “If this is done
in good faith—as can happen—the Florida provision imposing daily
fines is preempted by § 230(e)(3).”113 Second, parts of Fla. Stat.
§ 501.2041 are similarly preempted by the federal law. Fla. Stat.
§ 501.2041(2)(b) provides that a social media platforms must apply
censorship, deplatforming, and shadow banning in a consistent
manner.114 This provision would also infringe on a platform’s right to
use their discretion when deciding which content to censor. By forcing a
platform to apply censorship in a consistent manner, the Florida statute
would mandate that a social media platform censor innocuous content
the same way they would treat content that violates the platform’s
standards. Again, this provision is preempted by § 230.115 Additionally,
Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(2)(d) is inconsistent with the federal law. Under
(2)(d), a social media platform may not censor content without first
notifying the user whom the platform is restricting.116 As discussed in
more detail above, a social media platform has the unbridled discretion
to determine how to restrict content in accordance with their statutory
rights under 47 U.S.C. § 230. Mandating that a social media platform
notify a user before restricting content is a further violation of their
rights under the federal statute.117 Both Fla. Stat. § 106.072 and some
provisions in § 501.2041 are therefore preempted by 47 U.S.C. § 230.
The court in NetChoice dissected the Florida statutes aimed at
regulating social media platforms and held that the statutes could not
survive First Amendment strict scrutiny.118 Moreover, several
provisions are preempted by § 230.119 Accordingly, the court granted the
plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction and ordered the State to
“take no steps to enforce Florida Statutes §§ 106.072 or 501.2041 until
otherwise ordered.”120 Nevertheless, the State is not yet ready to
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surrender on their controversial law. Less than two weeks following the
decision in NetChoice, the State of Florida filed an appeal challenging
the preliminary injunction and the district court’s findings. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit will not issue its
decision for some time, but it is never too soon to start considering how
the State might try to carefully thread the needle to reverse the lower
court’s decision.
VII. THREADING THE NEEDLE
There are several arguments the State could make in an effort to
persuade future courts to uphold the Florida statutes. The first
argument is one that courts have been reluctant to examine but the
State will almost certainly make. The State will argue that social media
platforms should be treated as common carriers. This argument has
been floated by legal scholars for years and would allow courts to treat
social media providers differently than ordinary speakers under the
First Amendment. The second argument the State could make is that
the blocking, censoring, and deplatforming of users is not protected
under § 230 because the social media platform’s actions are not done in
“good faith,” which is required under the federal law.121 Both arguments
are grounded in very little precedent, but nevertheless might be the
only hope for the Florida statutes’ survival.
A. Common Carriers
The Supreme Court has defined a “common carrier” as one that
“makes a public offering to provide [communications facilities] whereby
all members of the public who choose to employ such facilities may
communicate or transmit intelligence of their own design and
choosing.”122 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that common
carriers have long been subjected to special regulations including “a
general requirement to serve all comers.”123 Furthermore, regulations
placed on common carriers may be justified when “a business, by
circumstances and its nature, rises from private to be of public
concern.”124 There is precedent for treating communication networks in
a similar manner as traditional common carriers and regulating them
as such. This is especially true when the communication networks hold
121. 47 U.S.C. § 230.
122. Federal Communications Commission v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701
(1979).
123. Biden v. Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University, 141 S. Ct.
1220, 1222 (2021) (Thomas, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 1223 (citing German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914)).

2022

BURNING THE HOUSE TO ROAST A PIG

685

themselves out to the public and have a dominant market share of the
kind of communication they provide.125 Some examples include
telephone communication companies. Since the communication
networks hold themselves out to the public and have a monopoly over
the medium, the government has granted these networks “special
privileges.”126 “By giving these companies special privileges,
governments place them into a category distinct from other companies
and closer to some functions, like the postal service, that the State has
traditionally undertaken.”127 Government regulations applied to such
common carriers have been subject to a lower level of scrutiny
compared to other private networks.
Can digital networks like social media platforms be considered
common carriers? “In many ways, digital platforms that hold
themselves out to the public resemble traditional common carriers.”128
Users of these platforms rely on the networks for all of their news and
political engagements. Furthermore, some social media platforms
dominate the market share thus making them akin to common carriers.
For example, Facebook has over three billion users and Google makes
up 90% of all online searches.129 “[T]his concentration gives some digital
platforms enormous control over speech.”130 When assessing whether a
platform’s dominance in the market makes it a common carrier, it is
important to look at the available alternatives to using such a platform.
However, sites like Twitter and Facebook do not have many such
alternatives. The alternatives that do exist are not even comparable to
these monopolistic social media sites. Accordingly, these factors—public
usage and market share—do favor treating large social media platforms
like common carriers, thus permitting government regulations that are
subject to a lower level of scrutiny. However, Congress has been
reluctant to pass regulations treating social media companies as such.
To the contrary, Congress, in passing § 230, did the opposite by
shielding social media platforms from liability. The Supreme Court has
not made a decision on whether social media platforms are akin to
common carriers because the issue has never been formally brought
before the Court. Perhaps the Supreme Court will have its opportunity
if the Eleventh Circuit’s upcoming decision is appealed.
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The State of Florida anticipated legal challenges from social media
providers when drafting S.B. 7072. In many ways, the Florida
legislature began arguing that social media companies should be
treated as common carriers long before there were any challenges to the
law. The anticipation of lawsuits led the legislature to include the
common carrier argument in the language of the bill itself. The
“findings” section of the bill provides that “[s]ocial media platforms hold
a unique place in preserving first amendment protections for all
Floridians and should be treated similarly to common carriers.”131 The
inclusion of such language stands to reason that the Florida
government intended on making this argument to rebuke claims that
the statutes violated the First Amendment, and the State argued just
that when the law was eventually challenged.
The NetChoice court did not go into great detail in dismissing the
State’s common carrier argument. The court briefly acknowledged the
argument in their decision before ultimately finding that social media
platforms are not solely common carriers:
That brings us to issues about First Amendment treatment of socialmedia providers that are not so clearly settled. The plaintiffs say, in
effect, that they should be treated like any other speaker. The State
says, in contrast, that social-media providers are more like common
carriers, transporting information from one person to another much as
a train transports people or products from one city to another. The
truth is in the middle.132
As discussed above, the district court determined that the Florida
statutes should be held to traditional First Amendment scrutiny thus
dismissing the State’s common carrier argument. On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit will hear the State’s argument again. However, the
result will likely be no different. Social media platforms simply do not
have the same properties as traditional common carriers. They are
private companies, which are entitled to the same free speech rights as
any other individual. While public discourse including political speech
is certainly a public concern, the social media providers do not inhibit
such discourse. In fact, social media providers facilitate speech by
providing a platform for such speech to occur. Even if a social media
platform censored or silenced a group of individuals with opposing
political views, there are still hundreds of other forms of online
communication where these groups could convey their ideas and
viewpoints. Additionally, while the large social media companies like
Facebook and Twitter dominate the social media market, the Internet
131. S.B. 7072, 123rd Leg., Reg. Sess.
132. NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *8.
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has the ability to foster alternatives. For the aforementioned reasons, it
is my belief that these social media platforms are not like common
carriers, and the Eleventh Circuit’s decision will likely reflect that
notion.
B. Good Faith Under § 230
While the State could make the common carrier argument to
overcome the issue of First Amendment scrutiny, the State will still
need to solve the issue of preemption by § 230. One argument that could
be made is that the censoring and deplatforming of conservative voices
by social media platforms is not done in “good faith.” Under § 230, social
media platforms shall not “be held liable on account of—any action
voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable . . . . “133 Therefore, only those acts by social media
platforms taken in good faith are protected under the law, and it could
be argued that some acts of censorship are not done in good faith, and
thus not protected. Similar to the State’s common carrier argument, the
Florida legislature alluded to this argument in the text of S.B. 7072.
The bill provides that “[s]ocial media platforms that unfairly censor,
shadow ban, deplatform, or apply post-prioritization algorithms to
Florida candidates, Florida users, or Florida residents are not acting in
good faith.”134 However, for the State to successfully make this
argument, courts will first have to determine what constitutes good
faith under the federal law and what does not.
Courts have held that the availability of the exemption created by
§ 230 is not automatic and depends on “some evidence” of good faith.135
The problem is that the threshold of showing such evidence is extremely
low and involves a social media platform’s subjective determination of
what content is objectionable.136 Almost any showing that content is
objectionable to a social media platform will entitle such platform to
protection under § 230. It is nearly impossible to argue that a social
media platform does not act in good faith when censoring content that
they themselves consider objectionable. The real issue, and reason the
State’s argument will not succeed, is that what might be considered
objectionable to a social media platform may not be considered
133. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (emphasis added).
134. S.B. 7072, 123rd Leg., Reg. Sess.
135. See Sabbato v. Hardy, No. 2000CA00136, 2000 WL 33594542 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec.
18, 2000).
136. Ian C. Ballon, E-Commerce and Internet Law § 37.05[4][B] (2020).
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objectionable by the user who is being censored. Due to the subjectivity
of what is objectionable under § 230, the State will never succeed
simply by making a blanket assertion that social media companies do
not exercise good faith when censoring conservatives. The State would
need to assert specific instances of bad faith which require specific
assertions of fact. The bottom line is that social media platforms will be
presumed to act in good faith so long as what they are censoring meets
their own definition of objectionability.
VIII. FINAL THOUGHTS
The Florida social media statutes were passed by Governor DeSantis
in an effort to “reign in” liberal controlled social media platforms.
DeSantis and thousands of other conservatives in the United States
contend that social media providers like Twitter and Facebook use their
broad influence and power to silence conservative voices by
deplatforming and shadow banning politically right-leaning users. The
Florida statutes prohibit social media platforms from wrongfully
censoring and shadow banning users, particularly candidates for
political office, by regulating the activity and editorial discretion of
social media providers. The statutes would likely succeed at regulating
platforms if it wasn’t for First Amendment protections afforded in the
United States Constitution.
A. The Eleventh Circuit Decision
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals is likely to soon come to the
same conclusion as the District Court for the Northern District of
Florida. The statutes simply cannot overcome First Amendment
scrutiny. The laws are content-based restrictions on speech and
editorial judgment. Courts have long held that such content-based
restrictions are subject to the highest levels of scrutiny. Additionally,
the laws are clearly viewpoint-based. The Florida legislature and
Governor have not been shy regarding the true purpose of the laws. As
demonstrated by the Governor’s signing statement, the laws are an
attempt to control the liberal “oligarchs” that operate large social media
platforms. Both content-based and viewpoint-based laws are subject to
strict scrutiny. To overcome strict scrutiny, the laws must both further
a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest. Here, the Florida laws accomplish neither. The statutes are far
from narrowly tailored and extremely vague as to what a social media
platform is. Additionally, controlling the speech of a private platform is
far from a compelling state interest. The Florida government has no
reasonable argument that would enable the laws to overcome strict
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scrutiny. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit will likely find these statutes
to be both unconstitutional and preempted by § 230.
B. Florida’s Short-Sighted Approach
The Florida statutes were passed to regulate social media platforms
and encourage free speech on their sites. It is my belief that the
statutes themselves represent a threat to free speech. In their most
basic form, the statutes prohibit social media providers from exercising
their own editorial discretion when deciding what speech to include on
their sites. The statutes are nothing more than a government’s attempt
to control private companies and dictate what speech the company can
and cannot have on their sites. Is that not the exact regulation on
speech that the Framers of the First Amendment sought to forbid? The
true purpose of the First Amendment is to restrict the government’s
ability to regulate free speech, especially political speech. How can the
Florida government claim they are promoting free speech, while at the
same time attempting to control the speech of a private entity?
Let us assume, arguendo, that conservatives are censored by large
social media platforms. That still does not give the government the
right to circumvent the First Amendment and control a private entity.
The Florida government should recognize that if these statutes are
upheld, they will succeed in controlling a private company’s editorial
discretion at a huge cost. These statutes will undoubtedly benefit
conservative users who have been censored and deplatformed. However,
what is good for one political party today may be disadvantageous to the
same party in the future. Upholding these statutes will open the door to
government control of private social media companies. Governor
DeSantis and proponents of the legislation claim to be on the side of the
First Amendment yet, in the future, may quickly find themselves
defending conservative platforms that are subject to similar Democrat
bills aimed at regulating them. As the court in NetChoice so elegantly
articulated, the statutes are an example of “burning the house to roast a
pig.”137
The Florida statutes are a product of a short-sighted attempt at
political theatrics, that if upheld could come back to silence more
conservative voices than the law initially protected. Even if social media
platforms wrongfully censor conservative voices, the alternative is
much worse. The alternative is government control over free speech;
something that conservatives have long claimed to stand against. The
alternative would create a precedent that grants governments the

137. NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *11.
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authority to control private platforms and the speech they choose to
promote or censor. While censorship may stifle public discourse or be
unfair to a certain political ideology, the alternative—government
regulation—is far more sinister and will only serve to slowly erode at
our First Amendment right to free speech.
C. The Free Market Solution
The Florida statutes will undoubtedly be held to be unconstitutional
by the courts. However, if there is in fact a disparity between the way
large social media platforms censor conservative accounts versus those
accounts with liberal leanings, then luckily there is a perfectly legal
constitutional solution to the issue. That solution is the free market.
Conservatives who are outraged by social media platforms should
simply boycott the allegedly partisan sites. I’m not claiming the boycott
would hurt the deep pockets of Twitter CEO, Jack Dorsey, or Facebook’s
Mark Zuckerberg, but such a boycott could signal to savvy investors
that there is a need for an alternative to liberal-leaning social media
platforms: a platform made by conservatives for conservatives.
I know this free-market solution might be viewed as somewhat naïve
considering the sheer size and indisputable power of sites like Facebook
and Twitter. Nevertheless, I see few other legal solutions to the
purported issue of social media providers’ discrimination of political
foes. The Florida statutes and the challenges thereto have shown that
governments will be unable to regulate these providers through
legislative acts. Moreover, the government’s ability to regulate speech
on social media platforms would violate the most fundamental
principles of free speech found in the Constitution. This leaves only the
free market solution. Again, while this might not be the most expedient
or practical solution, it is the constitutional solution, and I fear that the
alternative is far more treacherous.
IX. CONCLUSION
Governor Ron DeSantis’s attempt at regulating social media
platforms through legislative acts is the first of its kind. However, the
Florida statutes will ultimately fail strict scrutiny and be held
unconstitutional. While promoting the equal treatment of conservative
users on social media platforms is an admirable goal, using legislation
to accomplish it is far less commendable. The First Amendment’s true
purpose is to protect private individuals from government regulation of
free speech. Upholding the Florida statutes would run contrary to that
purpose and open the door to future partisan-driven legislation aimed
at controlling the speech of political adversaries. The free market could
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be a possible alternative to government regulations, albeit not an
efficient solution.
Perhaps the real solution to the issue of political bias is to expel the
divisive partisan culture that has infiltrated every aspect of American
society. Perhaps the real solution is learning to respect one another’s
ideologies irrespective of party affiliation. Regardless of what you
believe, the answer is never government regulation of free speech.
Accordingly, Governor DeSantis will have to go back to the drawing
board to accomplish his goal of leveling the playing field for
conservative social media users.

